Ten years Council of Europe Rec(2004)11: Lessons learned and outlook by Driza Maurer, Ardita
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2014
Ten years Council of Europe Rec(2004)11: Lessons learned and outlook
Driza Maurer, Ardita
Abstract: E-voting must comply with requirements for democratic votes and elections. Adopted in 2004,
the Council of Europe Recommendation Rec(2004)11 is one of the first regulatory efforts in this area
and so far the only one at the international level. Its ambition is to map legal principles for democratic
elections with operational and technical requirements specific to e-voting. This paper presents an overview
of lessons learned from the application of the Recommendation during the past ten years and discusses
the need for an update.
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-133866
Originally published at:
Driza Maurer, Ardita (2014). Ten years Council of Europe Rec(2004)11: Lessons learned and outlook.
In: 6th International Conference on Electronic Voting, Lochau/Bregenz, Austria, 28 October 2014 - 31
October 2014, 111-117.
Ten Years Council of Europe Rec(2004)11  
Lessons learned and outlook 
 
Ardita DRIZA MAURER 
Jurist, Ll.M., Consultant 
Switzerland 
info@electoralpractice.ch 
 
Abstract— E-voting must comply with requirements for 
democratic votes and elections. Adopted in 2004, the Council of 
Europe Recommendation Rec(2004)11 is one of the first 
regulatory efforts in this area and so far the only one at the 
international level. Its ambition is to map legal principles for 
democratic elections with operational and technical requirements 
specific to e-voting. This paper presents an overview of lessons 
learned from the application of the Recommendation during the 
past ten years and discusses the need for an update. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to 
member States on legal, operational and technical standards 
for e-voting, also known as Rec(2004)11 [17], was adopted on 
30 September 2004 by the Committee of Ministers which also 
took note of the Explanatory memorandum thereto [18]. Both 
documents were compiled by a Multidisciplinary Ad Hoc 
Group of Specialists on legal, operational and technical 
standards for e-enabled voting. 
The Recommendation defines e-voting as an e-election or 
e-referendum that involves the use of electronic means at least 
in the casting of the vote, covering both e-voting in controlled 
(e.g. voting machines in polling stations) and in uncontrolled 
environments (e.g. internet voting from a private computer). 
Rec(2004)11 became rapidly a reference for Council of 
Europe (CoE) States that introduce or envisage introducing e-
voting1. It remains so far the only international instrument to 
propose an e-voting regulation. 
Two additional instruments [14][15] were adopted in 2010, 
however with the lower status of guidelines. They propose 
guidance on certification and transparency issues and are 
meant to complete the recommendations on these issues2. A 
formal proposal to update the Recommendation was 
                                                          
1 Country reports presented at the CoE biennial meetings on e-voting (see 
http://www.coe.int/t/dgap/democracy/Activities/GGIS/E-
voting/Default_en.asp ) reflect the implementation of the recommendations by 
countries. U.S. EAC 2011 report on internet voting found that in particular 
internet voting systems were either conceived or updated by incorporating the 
CoE Recommendation.  
2 Transparency is dealt in paragraphs 20 to 23 (Appendix I) and certification 
in paragraphs 111 and 112 (Appendix III) of the Recommendation. 
introduced in the 2012 review meeting. The issue of an update 
is on the agenda of the 2014 review meeting3. 
This paper reflects on the necessity of updating 
Rec(2004)11 based on e-voting experiences and the use of the 
Recommendation in the past ten years in the CoE region. The 
main arguments in favour of an update include lessons learned 
by experimenting with e-voting or by observing it, critical 
assessments of the Recommendation as well as technical 
developments (section 2). A possible line for approaching the 
update is presented by way of conclusion (section 3). 
The paper is based on our report to the Council of Europe 
on the possible update of the Recommendation [19]. The 
report was discussed at a CoE's organized meeting of experts 
in Vienna (19 December 2013). Findings are grounded mainly 
on the documents of the four CoE biennial review meetings 
that took place since its adoption, on e-voting regulations and 
evaluations (e.g. by countries, by international organizations, 
etc.) and on e-voting related work by organizations or 
countries beyond the CoE region. The paper focuses on e-
voting regulatory issues alone.  
II. LESSONS LEARNED 
A. The special place of Rec(2004)11 
A recent study [2] mentioned that emerging international 
electoral standards on e-voting are struggling to catch up with 
the introduction of technology into the voting and counting 
process. This could also apply to Rec(2004)11.  
The starting point for introducing the Recommendation in 
2004 was the observation that member states are already 
using, or considering using e-voting for a number of purposes 
(see the Preamble). Ten years later, OSCE/ODIHR [34] 
observed that today, almost all electoral processes make some 
use of new technologies from voter registration to tabulation 
of results.  
Regulating e-voting is a challenging task and countries 
look for guidance. The Recommendation timely responded to 
such needs, rapidly becoming a reference (see also [27] on the 
                                                          
3 A fifth review meeting on the Recommendation organized by the Council of 
Europe will be held on 28 October 2014 in Lochau/Austria, back to back with 
EVOTE 2014. 
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role of Rec(2004)11 in fostering e-democracy). It is still the 
only international instrument to propose standards for 
regulating remote and non remote e-voting. The adoption of 
common standards in the Recommendation was considered 
key to guaranteeing the respect of all the principles of 
democratic elections and referendums when using e-voting 
[18] [37].  
A number of organisations have produced guidelines on 
the introduction of new technologies in voting. The 
OSCE/ODIHR [34], IDEA [5] the Carter Center [10], the 
Organization of American States [33] and the National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs [35] have 
approached the issue of standards for electronic voting and 
counting technologies from the perspective of election 
observers. IFES [24] proposes a step-by-step approach to the 
introduction of e-voting, including legal considerations. IFES 
[45], IDEA [25] or the EU [23] discuss key principles that 
should inform the introduction of e- voting or more generally 
of technology in elections. The Council of Europe also 
developed a Handbook [16] to provide guidance on the steps 
to be considered when introducing e-voting. 
These documents focus on identifying good practices or 
formalizing procedures. They do not aim at providing an e-
voting regulation and most of them are domain specific 
focusing on the needs of election officials, observers and so 
on. They need to be taken into account when updating the 
Recommendation but they are not equivalent to it (e.g. in their 
respective scopes) and no substitute to it. One explanation to 
that may lie in the fact that no other institution has a mandate 
equivalent to the CoE in setting electoral standards, at least in 
Europe4. 
Rec(2004)11 has also been referenced by countries and 
organizations beyond the CoE region when considering e-
voting regulations or standards. A study commissioned by 
Elections Canada [39] considers the work done by CoE in this 
field as the most extensive while creating a legal framework 
for a new technology. It recommends election officials to 
consider referencing the Rec(2004)11 check-list. The U.S. 
Electoral Assistance Commission [40] has referenced the 
Recommendation in an effort to locate standards and 
requirements on internet voting utilized elsewhere in the world 
which include voting specific functionality, accessibility and 
security requirements. 
B. Guiding principles or detailed requirements? 
Rec(2004)11 is a pioneer effort which attempts to apply a 
finite but not consolidated number of legal requirements for 
democratic elections, dispatched in a set of international 
instruments only some of which are mentioned in the 
Preamble of the Recommendation, to e-voting. 
                                                          
4 According to article 1 of the 1949 adopted Statute of the Council of Europe 
the organization has the aim to achieve a greater unity between its members 
for the purpose of safeguarding and realising principles which are their 
common heritage. This aim shall be pursued by agreements and common 
action in legal and administrative matters. Article 15 of the CoE Statue 
foresees that action may take the form of recommendations to the 
governments of members. Available: 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/001.htm 
The Recommendation is a non-mandatory instrument 
despite the fact that it has been accepted unanimously by the 
Council of Ministers and it says that member states should 
consider reviewing their relevant domestic legislation in the 
light of this Recommendation when introducing e-voting 
(recommendation iii). Furthermore the text of the 
Recommendation and of the Explanatory Memorandum itself 
imply that the recommendations are not exhaustive. However, 
in several cases, the Recommendation has been considered as 
a ready-to-use check-list of requirements for building and 
evaluating e-voting systems. Whether the Recommendation is 
ready for this use is questionable. 
Since the first review meeting in 2006 it has been 
reconfirmed that the Recommendation was accepted by 
member States as a valid benchmark by which to assess and 
evaluate e-voting systems. At the same time it has been 
admitted that several issues, such as accreditation, certification 
or observation needed further research. The two guidelines on 
certification and transparency were endorsed as providing a 
common reference to be viewed, however, as work in progress 
since the practical experiences in the field of e-voting were in 
constant evolution. The last 2012 review meeting concluded 
that existing loopholes, ambiguities or tensions in the 
Recommendation justify a formal update. 
Norway is the only country to have given Rec(2004)11 
recommendations (with few exceptions however) the status of 
legal basis regulating both 2011 and 2013 internet voting trials 
[31][32]. However some of the recommendations were 
excluded and Norway also introduced verification 
mechanisms which are not dealt with in the Rec(2004)11 such 
as return codes [4]. 
The Norwegian system has been evaluated [1] for its 
conformity to Rec(2004)11 (see also [3]). The evaluation [1] 
concludes that as a package, the Council of Europe 
Recommendations represent a very comprehensive and 
detailed set of standards for the conduct of electronic voting. 
The Norwegian Internet voting system was found compliant 
with 85 out of the 102 relevant recommendations and non-
compliant with three recommendations. This was considered a 
significant achievement given the exacting nature of the 
Council of Europe Recommendations. The difficulties 
encountered in applying the requirements of Rec(2004)11 
prompted the authors to present a critical assessment of the 
recommendations.  
The study [1] concluded that the Recommendation does 
not build on existing public international law, that it says little 
on the legal basis, that it aims at designing standards 
applicable to all circumstances and such a broad scope is 
problematic when it comes to their implementation, that it 
ignores the fact that trade-offs between standards are 
sometimes necessary in electronic voting (such as the need for 
secret voting against the need for transparency, and the need to 
be able to audit the function of the voting system), that the 
need to comply with the Recommendation as a whole is 
problematic, that a number of standards may appear to be 
overlapping or redundant, that the wording is sometimes 
vague (interpretation is needed) and other times too detailed 
and, finally, that the recommendations are technically neutral 
!
 - 112 - 
 
in their wording, but not in their consequences when 
attempting to comply. 
Similar critiques on the wording and structure of 
Rec(2004)11 were also issued earlier in two theoretical 
analysis of the Recommendation [26], [30]. Without 
considering the merits of the standards included in the 
Recommendation, [30] employed engineering requirements 
and reverse engineering techniques to show that standards are 
expressed in a poor way and to make a first, simple, 
restructuring of the Recommendation. Considering the 
Recommendation as a check-list of requirements for system 
certification purposes, the study concludes that the 
Recommendation as it stands makes certification against 
standards difficult. Several "original flaws" are identified 
including inconsistency, incompleteness and unclear scope, 
over-specification, under-specification, redundancy and 
repetition as well as maintainability and extensibility issues. 
The authors believe that a broadly applicable instrument 
would be genuinely useful both to governments procuring e-
voting systems, and to vendors developing and maintaining 
such systems. So they undertake a first-step restructuring of 
the Recommendation, rooting out the identified original flaws. 
Another study on a concrete use of the Recommendation 
[20] questioned the possibility for Rec(2004)11 to handle 
sufficiently real-world attacks against elections using e-voting. 
Under this perspective the Recommendation was considered 
as being (or ought be) specific enough as to provide detailed 
solutions to deal with specific threats such as skilled, creative, 
personally motivated and appropriately equipped students 
planning and executing attacks against e-voting systems. The 
authors propose that Rec(2004)11 be further improved by 
explicitly pointing out the necessity of implementing adequate 
countermeasures to different types of attacks and that the 
development of a special security strategy to deal with attacks 
that target voters' acceptance of e-voting should be 
recommended in Rec(2004)11. 
The discussion on the adequacy of national regulations to 
cover current forms of e-voting and the required level of detail 
of such regulations is informative also for Rec(2004)11 given 
the similar challenges that all regulations face. The German 
Constitutional Court considered in its 2009 decision [8] that 
the Federal Ordinance on the Deployment of Voting Machines 
in Elections was unconstitutional because it did not contain 
provisions ensuring that only those voting machines are 
approved and used which comply with the constitutional 
preconditions of the principle of the public nature of elections 
(see paragraph 145 and ff. of the Court's decision) which 
requires that each voter, without any specific technical 
knowledge, is able to make sure that the system performs 
correctly.  
The Austrian Constitutional Court in its 2011 decision [42] 
arrived at a similar conclusion, although based on different 
principles. The act regulating the elections of the Students' 
Union was found to be unconstitutional because it did not 
provide detailed requirements on the e-voting system and on 
the procedures to ensure that competent authorities could 
exercise their controlling rights. Both the German and the 
Austrian quashed regulations have not been updated since.  
The Estonian Constitutional Judgement of the Supreme 
Court of 2005 [38] examined the e-voting legal basis only 
from the point of view of the principle of constitutionality in 
relation with the right to change a vote in the internet voting 
context alone. The Court explained that the right to change the 
e-vote is in accordance with the CoE Recommendation [29] 
and with the Estonian Constitution.  
The adequacy and level of detail of national e-voting 
regulations have been discussed elsewhere as well. Belgium 
Federal and Regional Administrations commissioned a 
thorough study on e-voting [6] which considers Rec(2004)11 
as the main benchmark for evaluating e-voting. 
Finland's use of voting machines in polling stations was 
monitored in the light of Rec(2004)11 by both Electronic 
Frontier Finland [21] - a Finnish non-profit - and the Council 
of Europe, Congress of Local and Regional Authorities [44].  
France's non-remote e-voting is regulated by specific 
legislation while remote internet voting, must comply with 
recommendations by the National Commission on Informatics 
and Liberties [12] whose structure and content presents many 
commonalities with Rec(2004)11. A recent thorough report 
[11] recommended that the list of legal requirements for 
authorizing the use of voting machines must be completed 
(recommendation 2). 
Netherlands discontinued all forms of e-voting because, in 
addition to computer security problems, the embedding of the 
voting machines within the legal framework was considered 
very weak. Another lesson from the Netherlands is that 
technical choices made in the past to embed basic principles of 
elections need to be periodically reconsidered [28]. 
Swiss federal legislation on e-voting from uncontrolled 
environments introduced in 2002 presented many 
commonalities with Rec(2004)11 [7]. The Federal Ordinance5 
was recently modified to reflect lessons learned during the 
past ten years [13] and was completed with a detailed 
technical regulation6.  
To conclude, the scope and aim of the Recommendation 
need to be clarified. While Rec(2004)11 was initially intended 
to provide guidance, it has in several occasions been referred 
to as a complete and comprehensive list of requirements 
against which to evaluate e-voting systems. As a guiding 
document the Recommendation is sometimes too detailed and 
when considered as a take-it-or-leave-it check-list of 
requirements its application has proved difficult.  
Furthermore the level of detail of the Recommendation 
requires special attention. In the light of experiences made and 
lessons learned so far it can be assumed that a readily 
implementable check-list of requirements will receive greater 
attention. It should be comprehensive and coherent to facilitate 
implementation and control. It should at least contain 
necessary requirements to ensure compliance of e-voting with 
                                                          
5 In force since 15 January 2014, http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-
compilation/19780105/index.html  
6 In force since 15 January 2014, the technical regulation is a Federal 
Chancellery Ordinance: http://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-
compilation/20132343/index.html 
!
 - 113 - 
  
all international standards for democratic elections while 
leaving individual countries the necessary room for 
implementing their own electoral specificities. 
C. Placing e-voting into its context  
Reference [26] found it problematic that requirements 
(mainly security requirements) for e-voting are measured (as 
secure as) against requirements for non-electronic voting 
systems. As there exist no widely accepted metrics for 
measuring, reasoning by analogy flaws the comparison 
between the two. This critique needs to be addressed in a 
future update.  
Reference [26] also draws attention to the necessary 
distinction between matters of public policy which affect the 
whole electoral system and matters of voting technology when 
introducing recommendations. The following example from 
the implementation of the Recommendation illustrates this. 
In some cases, the same recommendation is implemented 
in opposing ways by different countries in accordance with 
their own specificities. This is the case with "secrecy and 
freedom of the vote" (recommendations 9 to 19). Norway and 
Estonia introduced multiple voting, or the right to change the 
e-vote for internet voters alone and a precedence of paper 
ballots over electronic ballots. This was meant to offer the 
voter a way to get around voting coercion and vote buying 
(which may arise in remote voting, because the voter can be 
forced to cast his or her vote in the presence of another 
person). Although multiple voting literally contradicts 
recommendation 5, [4] and [38] found that this may be 
interpreted to respect the Recommendation. France and 
Switzerland do not allow multiple voting and assign the same 
value to a validly issued ballot, be it on paper or electronic. 
Their point of view is that internet voting is just another form 
of distant voting from an uncontrolled environment, and that 
coercion will not be addressed differently for internet voting 
than for postal voting. ODIHR7 encourages France and 
Switzerland to introduce multiple voting but says nothing of 
the impact this would have on the system as a whole given the 
inequality it will create with other channels and the fact that 
not all voters have access to internet voting.  
The national legal context should be taken into account 
when regulating e-voting. Some issues may only concern e-
voting. Others, although introduced in an e-voting context, are 
a matter of public policy (for example related to remote 
voting) not of voting technology. Their introduction will affect 
the whole system. Furthermore the technical dimension of e-
voting is important and should be kept in mind when 
regulating it. Reasoning by analogy with postal voting has 
serious limits and must be used with care. 
D. Same provisions for different e-voting systems? 
Rec(2004)11 applies a number of legal requirements for 
democratic elections to an indefinite number of voting 
                                                          
7 See OSCE/ODIHR'S 2012 reports on both countries' parliamentary 
elections, http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections 
solutions, collectively known as remote and non-remote e-
voting, that only share one common characteristic: the use of 
electronics in casting the vote. As the above mentioned 
analysis of the conformity of the Norwegian system showed, 
several recommendations are clearly written with non-remote 
e-voting in mind and have proved difficult to implement in an 
internet voting context.  
Requirements and standards in the Recommendation 
should clearly indicate to which of the two types of e-voting 
they apply. Venice Commission [22] stated that e-voting in 
supervised environments must be treated differently from e-
voting in unsupervised environments. In particular, the issues 
of secrecy and freedom of the vote are to be handled 
differently in the two cases. So, a prior determination when 
updating the Recommendation should be clearly to distinguish 
between the two categories. There is general consensus on this 
admitted conclusion and it was included in the report of the 
Rec(2004)11 review meeting of 2012 as well. 
E. Technology developments, new concepts and solutions 
As indicated by its title, the Recommendation is multi-
disciplinary and requires combined expertise from different 
areas. Important work has taken place on the technical aspects 
of e-voting such as e-voting protocols, e-voting control and 
certification or e-voting increased transparency through 
cryptographic solutions8. Their consideration in the light of 
Rec(2004)11 goes beyond the scope of this paper. However 
their significance for the Recommendation needs to be 
examined in view of an update.  
An interesting example from a regulatory perspective is 
work on certification [43] as it illustrates the impact legislation 
has on the design and control of e-voting systems. The broad 
principles mentioned in Appendix I of the Recommendation 
serve as legal background. Based on them, detailed security 
requirements and methods to measure and evaluate e-voting 
systems' security have been developed. They must be 
considered in view of an update of the recommendations, 
namely those contained in Appendixes II and III. 
OSCE/ODIHR has monitored the use of e-voting in 
elections in different CoE countries. Its reports provide 
valuable information on the implementation of the 
Recommendation (which serves as a legal benchmark) as well 
as on the legal frameworks for e-voting in different countries9. 
ODIHR often gives substance to high-level requirements. Its 
2013 published Handbook for the observation of new voting 
technologies includes a collection of such detailed 
recommendations. However the leap from the general OSCE 
and Council of Europe requirements to specific 
                                                          
8 Proceedings of periodical conferences such as Bregenz EVOTE, EVT/Wote, 
and Vote-ID give a good overview of such developments. See the respective 
websites: http://www.e-voting.cc/en/publications/proceedings/ ; 
https://www.usenix.org/conference/evtwote ; http://www.voteid13.org/ 
9 OSCE/ODIHR has reported on the use of new voting technologies in several 
countries in the region and beyond, including Norway 2013, U.S.A. 2013, 
France 2012, Norway 2012, Switzerland 2012, Russian Federation 2012, 
Estonia 2011, Belgium 2007, Estonia 2007, Finland 2007, Kazakhstan 2007, 
the Netherlands 2007, Belgium (Expert Visit on New Voting Technologies) 
2006, Kazakhstan 2006. All reports can be retrieved from 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections  
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recommendations such as those on introducing verifiability in 
e-enabled elections, is somewhat huge and only based on the 
even-less-mandatory Guidelines on transparency10. 
Several new concepts have been discussed and even 
introduced in the past ten years in e-voting. Most of them aim 
at ensuring transparency and fostering trust and confidence in 
the e-voting channel and are reflected in the Guidelines on 
transparency. Such concepts include "the use of a second 
medium to store the vote to improve transparency", the related 
"mandatory count of the second medium in a statistically 
meaningful number of randomly selected polling stations", 
specific "rules dealing with discrepancies between the 
mandatory count of the second medium and the official 
electronic results", the requirement to "gain experience in 
providing mechanisms that allow voters to check whether their 
vote was counted as intended" (paragraphs 13 to 16 of the 
Guidelines). Also the concept of "chain of trust in e-enabled 
elections" according to which voters should be able to verify if 
their e-vote was cast as intended, recorded as cast and counted 
as recorded has been implemented, introducing a new 
possibility for the voter to prove that their own single e-vote 
was cast as intended, recorded as cast and counted as 
recorded.  
Although inspired by traditional voting, these mechanisms 
are new to electoral legislation. They are specific to e-voting 
and appear today as necessary to ensure that the public can 
place the same trust in e-voting as in other non-electronic 
voting systems. As usual with experiments, practice has so far 
preceded regulation. However we are now at a point where 
there exists a certain consensus on their use and they are being 
introduced in a number of countries11. Such new concepts and 
mechanisms being legally relevant, they need to be defined 
and their use regulated by law. The general requirements of 
transparency in the Recommendation and Guidelines do not 
regulate their implementation, operation, and control.  
In addition to new concepts, our understanding of existing 
concepts has evolved. Experience with e-voting machines in 
the U.S.A. for instance shows that while voting system 
standards and certification against standards are useful for 
examining the basic aspects of voting machines, they cannot 
ensure secure voting systems, security being a negative quality 
[9]. A recent report [36] recommended reforming the 
certification process and conducting systematic after-election-
auditing of voting equipment. Similar arguments are heard in 
Europe as well where the cost-efficiency of certification has 
been questioned and individual and universal verifiability is 
seen as offering better guarantees while at the same time being 
less costly than certification. 
In the light of the previous examples and given the 
recognized position of the Recommendation in the regulatory 
                                                          
10 Examples include the recommendation in 2007 that Belgium introduces 
legislation on voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) or an equivalent 
verification procedure and the recommendation (2012) to France and 
Switzerland to consider the use of a verifiable internet voting scheme or an 
equally reliable mechanism for voters to check whether or not their votes were 
cast as intended. 
11 In addition to Norway, Estonia and several Swiss cantons are introducing 
E2E verification mechanisms. 
field, it is necessary that Rec(2004)11 be updated to take into 
account technology developments and current practices. 
III. UPDATE OF REC(2004)11 
As with other technology related developments, e-voting 
regulation is being adjusted as technology advances and our 
understanding of it improves. In order to provide basic 
guidance for countries and also ensure that Council of 
Europe's electoral heritage is integrated in a coherent way in e-
voting regulations by countries, the Recommendation needs an 
update in the light of recent developments and experience 
gained. Below we will present some thoughts on how to tackle 
the updating work. 
A. Prior determinations 
Compared to a similar document, the U.S. Voluntary 
Voting System Guidelines (VVSG) [41], the structure and 
language of Rec(2004)11 is very different. Both are voluntary. 
However, if adopted, VVSG provides a check-list ready for 
use by authorities, vendors, certifying bodies, etc., while 
Rec(2004)11 was intended to provide guidance, although 
some parts of it are too detailed for such a purpose.  
Before undertaking a thorough update of the 
Recommendation, a decision has to be made on the kind of 
document we want. It can be assumed that a readily 
implementable (by authorities as well as by industry) check-
list will receive greater attention. This decision will influence 
the structure, content, level of detail and wording of the entire 
Recommendation.  
As mentioned earlier the level of detail requires attention. 
A detailed Recommendation may be interesting as countries 
look for guidance. However, the higher the level of detail, the 
greater the probability that the Recommendation cannot apply 
100% in a specific case. A solution could be to adopt a 
modular approach, instead of the current situation which 
requires that the Recommendation be applied as "one block". 
The modular approach implies a mandatory layer of 
recommendations (minimum standards applicable everywhere 
in the region) on which modules of additional, optional 
standards would be build. Both a generic document and a 
more detailed one are possible choices for the 
Recommendation. Both require a good interleaving of legal, 
operational and technical requirements. Once the level of 
detail has been decided, it has to be applied coherently 
throughout the document.  
Another prior determination would be clearly to 
distinguish recommendations dedicated to e-voting in 
controlled (polling stations) or in uncontrolled (remote voting) 
environments.  
The Recommendation and the two Guidelines were 
developed separately (respectively in 2004 and 2010) and 
have different legal value. However they are closely linked to 
each other. Consolidating the three documents (merging, 
simplifying and streamlining) may be necessary. 
In a second step, consideration may be given to a possible 
separation of hard-core requirements from more rapidly 
changing ones. Such a trend is observed in other similar 
!
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regulations such as the European Citizens Initiative regulatory 
framework12 as well as in national regulations on e-voting as 
shown by the latest modification of the Swiss federal 
regulation on e-voting. 
B. Updating policy 
Experiences indicate that an update of the 
Recommendation is currently necessary to reflect lessons 
learned and new developments. Additionally, a management 
and maintenance policy for the Recommendation is needed. 
This is necessary in particular if the Recommendation is 
conceived as a check-list of requirements with respect to 
technical requirements that embed legal principles for 
democratic elections. Experts from different disciplines such 
as law, engineering, mathematics etc. must be involved in the 
maintenance work. Their proposals should be validated by 
member States' representatives before being presented to the 
Committee of Ministers with the request to formally update 
the Recommendation. 
In this respect it is necessary to define an updating policy 
and the scope and purpose of updates. An updating 
opportunity cannot be used to question everything continually. 
An update being a further development of issues, it is up to the 
body responsible for mandating the update also to define and 
scope it. 
Update rates can fit in the biennial review cycle of 
Rec(2004)11 which is meant for recommendations and 
updates to be discussed in detail. However, the bulk of the 
work needs to be conducted by experts who will most 
probably meet more frequently, physically or virtually, in 
between meetings. Work done by them must be presented to 
and validated by member States' representatives at biennial 
meetings. 
Biennial review meetings are important and fulfil their 
mandate as long as they have an active role in the updating of 
the Recommendation. If no update is proposed, if there is no 
follow-up on countries' experiences and lessons learned, the 
Recommendation will gradually become obsolete and biennial 
meetings would lose their substance. 
C. Final remarks 
E-voting regulations are still in their infancy and have not 
yet reached the maturity of the rest of electoral legislation. 
This is also true for Rec(2004)11 whose application in the past 
ten years provides us with important lessons which, in return, 
call for an update.  
If work in 2004 started from a theoretical perspective, 
updating work in 2014 should start by considering the 
practical needs of administrations, voters, industry and other 
stakeholders.  
                                                          
12 See Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 February 2011 on the citizens’ initiative, (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:065:0001:0022:en:PDF) and 
the Commissions' implementing regulation of 17 November 2011 (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:301:0003:0009:EN:PDF) 
The initial enthusiasm for e-voting in 2004 has given way 
to more lucidity and maturity in the consideration of risks and 
opportunities. Today's understanding of IT and e-voting 
should be duly taken into account in the updating process.  
The aim is to ensure that the Recommendation is up-to-
date, balanced and responsive to ongoing developments. A 
revised Recommendation would allow the Council of Europe 
to maintain its position as a recognised and cutting-edge actor 
in the field of e-voting. 
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